The Challenger Disaster - Responsibility of Morton Thiokol Inc. Essay

The Challenger disaster was not moreover a disaster in terms of the destruction of the spacecraft and the ending of its crew but also in terms of the finality-making process that conduct to the launch and in terms of the subsequent investigation into the "causes" of the disaster. The decision to propose for launch was made by lower-level management officials over the objections of technical experts who oppose the launch under the environmental conditions that existed on the launch pad at the time. Furthermore, the lower-level managers who made this decision--both NASA and contractor personnel--chose not to report the objections of the technical experts in their recommendations to high(prenominal)(prenominal) levels in the management chain- of-command to proceed with the launch. Finally, it seems that the lower-level managers had also received out-of-the-ordinary pressure from higher levels of management (some allusions suggested this pressure may have come all the gu idance from the White House) to proceed with the launch on time. The subsequent investigation began with efforts to typeset the technical causes of the volley of the Challenger. Initially, the decision-making process steer to the launch was not considered by investigators. This suggests that the initial purpose of the investigation was not concerned with ethical issues or issues of accountability. As the investigation proceeded, information emerged through leaks to the press, which suggested that NASA had been aware of the risk of magnification under the environmental conditions that existed for the Challenger launch for several months prior to the launch. Also, the oppositeness of the technical experts to the launch just prior to the decision to launch became cognize to the investigators as well. These two pieces of information changed the nature of the investigation mid-stream from an effort to fix the technical cause of the explosion of the spacecraft to an investigation of thedecision-making process call foring to the launch. Viewing the Challenger disaster as an ethical problem would lead to an effort to determine whether the decision to launch was "right" or "wrong." Clearly, the explosion was an accident. It was an accident that might have been prevented or anticipated but the decision to launch was clearly a matter of brain--albeit of apparently poor judgment in retrospect--rather than... ...s associated with launching in the environmental conditions at the time. Lower-level managers were able to avoid accountability for both the final decision to launch (made by higher levels of management) and for recognition of the technical risks associated with launching (resting in the failure of technical experts to tin justification against launching in technical specializedations or formal regulations). distributively of these factors--the management chain-of-command, the role of technical specifications and formal regulations, a nd the availability of information--served to both hamper the ability of decision-makers to act and to obscure accountability for their decision-making. As such, they served to limit the responsibility of individuals within the decision-making process and to render that process itself irresponsible. These obstacles to responsibility within NASA pane to the more important ethical problem that existed beyond the scope of the specific instance of the Challenger disaster. Namely, the poor nature of the decision-making process within NASA and its oppose role in fostering responsibility, both on the part of individuals and on the part of the organization as a who